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FACULTY FOCUS
THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE INCREDIBLE
SHRINKING FOURTH
AMENDMENT
by Professor Bruce G. Berner
The following is an abridged version
of the Inaugural Lecture delivered by
Professor Bruce Berner. An in-depth
article, based on the lecture, will be
published in volume 24 of the
Valparaiso University Law Review.
INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution poses two
substantive questions about
governmental searching. The first,
"What is a search?", might be called
the amendment's "reach" and could
be restated, "What general type of
governmental activity is this
amendment interested in scrutinizing
and regulating?" The second and
logically subsequent question--"Which
searches are unreasonable?"--might
be termed the amendment's "grasp"
and could be restated: "From this
universe of 'searches', which are
permitted and which prohibited?" It
is, after all, only "unreasonable"
searches that the constitution
prohibits.
The fourth-amendment "reach"
cases are today in wild disarray and
the subject of widespread attack. The
thesis of today's lecture is that the
disarray, while it is particularly
notorious because of recent
decisions, springs from the fact that
the Supreme Court has never
formulated a coherent test for
"reach." It has, instead, historically
confused the "reach" and "grasp"
problems. While this confusion has
generated decisions which are
profoundly odd, it has done far
worse--it has assured that many
potential governmental abuses
cannot, without starting from scratch
on the "reach" formulation, be
correctly decided absent legislative
intervention. While commentators
for the most part agree (and I do
too) that the Supreme Court is
answering the question wrong, I
argue in this lecture that the
problem is deeper--the Court is
answering the wrong question.
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A. The Current Reach Formulation
1. Description

The fourth amendment provides,
in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated;
(There is a second clause about
warrants and probable cause, but it
has nothing to do with "reach" and
at the "grasp" level is wholly
subservient to the cited clause.)
Prior to 1967, this cited language
prompted the Court to apply two
tests for reach. One focused on
place and one on governmental
activity. The Court required that
both hurdles be jumped before it
would address the reasonableness
question. The fust hurdle--"Does
the case involve a place the fourth
amendment is concerned with?"--is
typified by Hester v. United States, a
case which held that any amount of
governmental seeking in an "open
field," property of the defendant
outside the house's protection, could
not be a "search." The second
hurdle--"Did the police engage in the
type of activity that the amendment
means to scrutinize?"--is typified by
Olmstead v. United States, which held
that police eavesdropping from one
hotel room to the next with a
detectaphone (a device that does not
physically penetrate the wall) was
not a search because it entailed no
physical trespass. Thus, until 1967,
there was no fourth-amendment
debate until the police trespassed
into a relatively short list of
''protected places."
In United States v. Katz (1967)
the polestar "reach" case, qefendant
was making a phone call from a
glass-enclosed public pay telephone.
Federal police attached an electronic
device to the top of the booth and
recorded the conversation which
became evidence in Katz's trial under
federal gambling laws. The Court
rejected both halves of its old "reach"
doctrine. First, as to place, it
rejected "persons, houses, papers and

effects" as being an exclusive list of
protected places and treated those
words as merely evocative of places
where the privacy interest is most
keenly felt. It broadened the "place"
part of reach to all places where a
person has an "actual and reasonable
expectation of privacy." The Katz
expansion of constitutional
protection fits nicely with other
decisions of the liberal Warren
Court, in full sail by 1967. Having
formulated this "reasonableexpectation-of-privacy" test, the
Court then held it reasonable to
expect that private phone
conversations, even when made in a
public phone booth, are not being
surreptitiously recorded. As to the
police activity side, the Court stated
that, given the state of technology,
one need not identify a trespass to
ftnd a search. What did the Court
replace trespass with? Nothing. The
idea of measuring "reach" by looking
at the police and their activities
dropped out of the analysis for all
practical purposes. The whole
question regarding "reach" now
focuses on place. Which places?
All places in which a person
entertains a "reasonable expectation
of privacy." This focus is on the
citizen--not on the government.
But, as I hope to demonstrate,
taking one's eyes off the government
when doing fourth-amendment
jurisprudence is a dangerous game.
The opportunity the Court
missed in Katz occurred immediately
after it held that "persons, houses,
papers and effects" was not an
exclusive list of protected places but
rather that privacy interests may exist
in countless places and contexts.
Once it said that, the Court could
have noticed that it was now
analyzing the Constitutional text as if
it read:
The right of the people to be
secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be
violated;
All that would have remained,
therefore, would be to defme what
"search" meant in terms of
governmental activity. Instead, the
Court, loathe to remove all place
limitation, reworked the place side
with a vaguer but self-consciously
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formulation--all places where
a "reasonable expectation of
.· But why limit fourth:nent protection to any place,
·r broadly defined? Why not
t such protection goes with all
to all places at all times?
must concede that a public
ITords less privacy than a
But privacy in general is not
rth amendment's concern. Its
_.....-:-..,........" is freedom from
;;;::~;enab le searches and seizures,
m which is not sensibly
..:r:lm&TJibed by time or place. A
rr.an can, to be sure, properly
a great deal about us when
in a public place. This is
-ever, because the fourth
':nent should not apply in a
place, but because his
:ations in public places are
likely to be unreasonable.

rs note: At this point, the
lation is tested against ten fact
· ns - some are decided cases,
hypo theticals.]
luation

·reasonable expectation of
formulation is, I believe, the
question to be asking wholly
fro m the matter of whether or
1:: Court is doing a good job of
ring it (It isn't.) The Court
by this formulation into
of lWO unpleasant postures, and
emonstrate it has adopted
either it must simply conclude
de force that given
Lions are unreasonable or it
ffer logical support. Let us
"-:e some of the justifications
Co n has offered
e Analogy to Private Citizens

Court, as we have seen in
t section, often invokes images
general public, the "curious
rsby," the flying public, or a
..---.""'""~te for the public (neighbors,
example) to find expectations of
• unreasonable. It is
ting to note how this analogy
and goes in the cases.
imes we hear about these folks

and sometimes we do not; often the
reason we do not is that these folks,
should they do what the police have
done, would be committing torts or
crimes. Of course the curious
passerby may glance, even
purposefully look, into a house from
the sidewalk. But if he begins
walking through "open fields,"
looking in buildings, and digging up
the earth, he will need a good
lawyer. He could fly over your
property, but if he stakes you out
with binoculars and startrons, he
might be liable in tort for "invasion
of privacy" or "outrage" and
prosecutable criminally under
Peeping-Tom Statutes.
When doing constitutional
jurisprudence, references to the
legality or illegality of actions of
private citizens are usually beside the
point. Tort law and criminal law,
among others, restrain private action.
The Constitution restrains state
action. This latter restraint is
sometimes more than the former,
sometimes less. If a policeman
breaks into a house and seizes drugs,
this is a search and seizure testable
under the fourth amendment. If a
private citizen were to do the same
thing, he would commit burglary and
theft. The fact that a private citizen
may or may not lawfully engage in a
given action is neither necessary nor
sufficient to conclude that a
policeman may or may not do that
same act for a governmental
purpose.
b. The "intimate activities" argument

In its decision in Riley (a case in
which the police hovered over the
defendant's back yard in a helicopter
to look into a greenhouse that was
not visible from street level, and
identified marijuana from a height of
400 feet), the Court notes: "As far
as thiS record reveals, no intimate
details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage were observed.... "
The Pennsylvania startron case (in
which the police staked out
defendant's third-floor apartment
from an apartment across the street
for nine days, and who, with the aid
of binoculars and a startron [an
infrared device which enhances
capacity to see into low light areas],

witnessed persons other than the
defendant engage in sexual activity)
indeed seems to turn not on what
the policeman did, but on what he
saw. But with all due respect, how
can one sensibly judge whether or
not activity is a search by reference
to what is observed? If police break
into your house and find nothing,
have they not been searching? Have
you not suffered the intrusion? This
kind of retrospective reasoning is like
saying that all events which happen
were perforce "foreseeable." Or even
"inevitable." I cannot imagine how a
person's right to privacy can, without
compromising the very idea of
privacy, be rationally made to turn
on what he does with it. The fourth
amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures not because
they may yield results but because,
regardless of their yield, they are
improper intrusions.
c. The Policeman's Location

Because the Katz question is
framed in terms of the expectations
of the homeowner to be free from
outside intrusion, the focus of the
recent cases is, as we have seen, on
where the policeman is located
rather than on what he sees (or
hears, etc.) into. Note the irony:
the "reasonable expectation" rubric,
an approach by which the Warren
Court self-consciously selected the
"protected-place" rather than the
"police-activity" perspective, ends up
under the Burger-Rehnquist courts
concentrating on where the
policeman is physically located rather
than on what place he intrudes
upon! To the extent the Court
now focuses on where a policeman
"has a right to be" and not on what
he has a "right to view," something
akin to the old trespass requirement
is back with a vengeance--the
policeman needs only to justify his
location, which is often outside any
protected area. And today, of
course, there are considerably more
tools to intrude on people's privacy
without physically trespassing into
"protected areas."
B. A Proposed Reach Formulation
l. Description
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The pre-Katz notion that "reach"
was a function of two perspectives-place and kind of activity--was
attacked head on by Professor
Anthony Amsterdam. Referring to
Katz, he stated:
If the word "intrusion" is
used, as "violated" plainly
was, to mean only that
interests protected have
been defeated by the
"Government's activities," I
have no quarrel with it.
The problem with the word
lies in its subtle suggestion
that a particular kind or
sort of government activity,
labeled an "intrusion," is
necessary to trigger the
fourth amendment. But
this, in my view, was
precisely the approach to
fourth amendment coverage
that Katz decisively rejected.
My argument is that this is precisely
the approach that Katz decisively
missed. Professor Amsterdam
continued:
The entire thrust of the
opinion is that it is needless
to ask successively whether
an individual has the kind of
interest that the fourth
amendment protects and
whether that interest is
invaded by a kind of
governmental activity
characterizable by its
attributes as a "search."
Rather, a "search" is
anything that invades
interests protected by the
amendment.
I agree with Professor Amsterdam
that there should be one test for
"reach," not two, but I suggest that
the Court in Katz chose the wrong
one. If we follow Professor
Amsterdam's suggestion that a
search is "anything that invades
interests protected by the [fourth]
amendment," we must next identify
those interests. If we attempt to
defme them broadly as "privacy,
security, liberty," the definition
includes many interests protected by
other constitutional guarantees, by
statutes, by common law, and some
interests not protected at all.
"Privacy"--what Justice Brandeis
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called "the most comprehensive ...
and the most valued by civilized
men," the "right to be let alone"--is a
constellation of interests protected,
in its various forms, by the first
amendment provisions dealing with
association and religion, the third
amendment on troop quartering, the
fifth-amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and the ninth
amendment retained-rights clause,
not to mention those privacycentered interests, like birth-control
information, which have been found
"emanating" and/or "penumbrating"
from the Constitution's text. By the
time we cull out these other aspects
of privacy, the "interest" underlying
the fourth amendment is to be free
from uninvited governmental
intrusions. The fourth amendment
"interest" is, in short, to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
If we then turn around and define a
"search" as "anything which defeats
this interest," we could be indicted
on suspicion of felonious questionbegging.
Rather than defme the activity in
terms of the interest (a search is
anything that intrudes on a
reasonable expectation of privacy) or
the interest in terms of activity (the
fourth amendment protects those
places we want free from intrusion),
I propose that we defme the
governmental activity in iJs own
terms--that we take the word "search"
to mean what it means. Pretty
radicaL My test for "reach" is as
follows: to search is physically to
seek through any of the senses for a
governmental purpose, including, of
course, crime detection.
I anticipate the following general
objection to my proposal that
"search" be defined as "any physical
seeking for a governmental purpose":
"That is entirely too broad.
Everything a policeman does is
searching under this definition."
Well, not everything. But, truth is,
police do a lot of searching. It is a
large part of the job. However, it
cannot be persuasively argued that
because activity happens routinely,
the Constitution ought take no note
of it--indeed, it ought to be
especially interested in it. And, of
course, most of these searches are

reasonable. The fourth amendment
will "reach" them, but it will not
"grasp" them. When they become
unreasonable, however, the fourth
amendment will be there to strike
them down.
And, at bottom, what has
happened, I think, is this. (I trust
you will grant me a short, political
digression.) Using the Riley
helicopter case as an example, the
Court, from a reading of the entire
record, concluded that, under the
circumstances (including the
anonymous tip), the police acted
properly to detect a suspected crime.
The Court was, therefore,
comfortable affirming Riley's
conviction. But it took this comfort
born of a judgment about the
conduct's "reasonableness" and
translated it--because the "reach"
doctrine is so tractable to this--into a
finding that the police were "not
searching."
But what of those cases looming
out there when the Court does not
think the police have acted properly?
The Court will want the
Constitution to "grasp" these cases
but its "reach" will be too short.
2. Testing

[Editors note: the proposed
formulation is, at this point, applied
to the same ten fact situations.]
3. Evaluation

The proposed "reach" formulation
produces, I think, demonstrably
better, more sensible, results in the
tested cases. Its focus is on the
police, not the vague "expectations"
of the average citizen. It frees the
Court to scrutinize all uninvited
intrusions under the fourth
amendment.
Yet, two categories of objections
to the proposed formulation can be
anticipated. At the "reach" level, a
test turning on governmental
motivation rather than location is
more difficult to administer. A
person's location is often provable
through direct evidence; his
motivation must usually be proved
circumstantially. Once a policeman
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learns that certain motivations place
his activity outside the fourth
amendment, what prevents him from
always claiming the innocent
motivation? Aside from the obvious
fact that police can attempt to
manipulate any rule (they can lie
now as to where they were), most of
the police activity involved in these
cases permit very unambiguous
inferences about motivation. The
law, including Constitutional law, is
rife with instances in which a court
must judge motivation, intent,
premeditation, knowledge, purpose,
belief, etc. and it accomplishes this
task, for the most part, without
grave difficulty. In troublesome
areas, courts can use well-proven
legal techniques to prevent abuse;
the burden of proof, for example,
can be imposed on the government
to disprove search motivation under
all or specified circumstances. One
can, for example, easily imagine a
rule which presumes a search, absent
strong rebutting evidence, whenever
a policeman enters a house.
The second category of objection
is that the proposed formulation,
because it recognizes so many more
"searches," places undue stress on
the "grasp" issue--"reasonableness."
It must be conceded that
reasonableness doctrine will have to
be more fmely tuned. Consider
these observations of Professor
Amsterdam:
The problem with the
graduated model, of course,
is [that] it converts the
fourth amendment into one
immense Rorschach blot.
The complaint is being
voiced now that fourth
amendment law is too
complicated and confused
for policemen to understand
and obey. Yet present law
is a positive paragon of
simplicity compared to what
a graduated fourth
amendment would produce.
The varieties of police
behavior and of the
occasions that call it forth
are so innumerable that
their reflection in a general
sliding scale approach could
only produce more slide
than scale.

It is often preferable, however, to
adopt a rule which generates
doctrinal complexity rather than one
which simplifies a problem by
ignoring it, especially when ignoring
it begs abuse, and, most especially,
when that abuse will come from the
government.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
in fact, since Professor Amsterdam's
cited writing, already gone a very
long way toward instituting the
graduated model of reasonableness.
Current doctrine recognizes all of
the following concepts: physical
restraint less than a typical arrest
(called a "stop") justified by less than
the probable cause required for
arrest; physical restraint more
intrusive than a common arrest (like
killing the arrestee, at the extreme)
justifiable only under compelling
circumstances; and "searches" less
intrusive than typical ("frisks,"
magnetometer scans at airports,
administrative searches, etc.) as well
as those searches uncommonly
intrusive (strip searches, body-cavity
searches, surgery to remove evidence,
etc.), all of which require respectively
less or more justification than usual.
The Court seems quite comfortable
administering this "sliding-scale"
approach to "reasonableness."
I do not believe that the task of
fitting all the new "searches" into this
existing graduated model would be
difficult. For example, the Court
could quickly establish that all
naked-eye searches from public
streets or sidewalks are per se
reasonable absent bizarre aggravating
circumstances; that views into a
house from a consenting neighbor's
property are justifiable upon a
showing of "reasonable suspicion";
that views into houses utilizing
advanced technology and/or strategic
location require "probable cause"
and, perhaps, prior judicial approval.
The varieties of police behavior may
be innumerable, as Professor
Amsterdam suggests, but they do
tend to fit into broad, predictable
categories. Despite the difficulty of
such a task, however, it is preferable
to burying the whole problem under
the headstone, "No Search."

CONCLUSION

To conclude, fourth-amendment
analysis should begin by scrutinizing
governmental activity to determine if
it is the kind of activity that
provision is concerned about. The
amendment, insofar as it extends to
searches, should be understood to
"reach" any physical seeking for a
governmental purpose. Such an
understanding would insure that the
Court's function as guardian of
constitutional liberties will not be
jeopardized by decisions which put
the reach too short. Once reach is
too short, other branches of
government must act to remedy
injustices; it is crucial to note that
many victims of governmental abuses
have historically not had much access
to those other institutions.
Under my proposal, which
governmental searches are
reasonable remains, as before, to be
debated in an ongoing judicial
discourse. The fourth amendment
should not grasp everything it can
reach. Indeed, the Constitution's
reach must exceed its grasp, or
what's a Supreme Court for?

Professor Bruce G. Berner, EA.
Valparaiso 1965, LL.B. Valparaiso
1967, LL.M Yale 1978.
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